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1. Introduction 
 
Nancy Cartwright argues that models rather than theories are the units of science that 
represent parts or aspects of the world: ‘theories in physics do not generally represent 
what happens in the world; only models represent in this way, and the models that do 
so are not already part of any theory’ (Cartwright 1999a, 180). Her work has been a 
driving force behind the now broadly accepted view that models are the primary 
representational units of science. 
 
This invites two questions: firstly, what is the relationship between theories and 
models? Many interesting discussions can be had about this question, and important 
parts of Cartwright’s work address this issue. Our concern, however, is the second 
question: in virtue of what do models represent selected parts or aspects of the world 
(in this context usually referred to as their target systems)? Cartwright admits that she 
has little to say about the relationship between models and their respective targets, 
beyond cautioning against thinking of representations in terms of structural 
isomophisms and appealing instead to a ‘loose notion of resemblance’ (1999a, 192-
93; cf. 1999b, 261-62). She fully accepts that ‘this is just to point to the problem, or 
label it, rather than say anything in solution to it’ (ibid.). But, as Morrison (2008, 70) 
notes when commenting on Cartwright’s theory of models, this is the crux of the 
problem of representation. So proving an account of in virtue of what models 
represent fills an important lacuna in Cartwright’s account, and this the aim of this 
paper.2  
 
A promising account of how to think about the representational relationship between 
models and the world emerges from the work of Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. 
Elgin. Our main contention is that scientific representation ought to be analysed in 
terms of their notion of representation-as. This suggestion has previously been made 
by Hughes (1997), and more recently by van Fraassen (2008) and Elgin herself 
(references below). However all of these discussions of scientific models remain by 
and large programmatic. The aim of this paper is to provide detail to the claim that the 
representational relationship between models and their targets is one of 
																																																								
1 Authors are listed alphabetically and can be reached at r.p.frigg@lse.ac.uk and j.nguyen1@lse.ac.uk. 
2 We do not suggest that Cartwright herself would agree with of our account. But it is worth noting that 
she does comment approvingly on Hughes’ account, which is kindred in spirit to ours.  
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representation-as. Doing so involves adding specificity to claims and definitions, as 
well as making a number of (friendly) amendments to the requisite machinery.3 
 
We begin with a discussion of Goodman’s and Elgin’s views on representation 
(Section 2). We then point out that a number of amendments are needed to transform 
this view into a theory of how models represent. We offer a statement of such a view, 
which we call the DEKI account of representation (Section 3). Material models and 
fictional models are the two most important classes of models and we indicate how 
the DEKI account deals with these models (Section 4). We end by briefly pointing out 
that none of the many criticisms that have been put forward against Goodman’s and 
Elgin’s views on representation pose a threat to our line of argument since these are 
typically specific to pictorial representation, which is not our concern (Section 5).  
 
We follow common usage and take ‘scientific representation’ to refer to the 
representation relation between models and selected parts or aspects of the world. 
Understood in a broader sense ‘scientific representation’ would also refer to other 
kinds of representations such as scientific graphs, images, and diagrams. Throughout, 
those who feel discomfort about this use of the term could substitute ‘model-
representation’ for ‘scientific representation’.  
 
2. Goodman and Elgin on Representation  
 
In a string of publications both Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin have 
developed an account of representation at the heart of which lies the posit that 
mimetic accounts are fundamentally at odds with our representational practices both 
in the arts and in the sciences: representation does not amount to producing an effigy 
of the real thing. When referring to views shared by both authors, we use the acronym 
‘GE’ to refer to them jointly.4 
 
In discussing their account we use X to stand for the object that does the representing 
(the picture, the model, the graph, …), Y to stand for the target of the representation 
(the Duke of Wellington, the solar system, the patient’s body temperature at different 
times, …), and, where appropriate, Z to denote the genre of a representation (what is 
meant by the ‘genre’ of a representation is discussed below).  
 
2.1 Reference  
 
At the most basic level, what characterises a representation is ‘aboutness’: a 
representation of Y is about Y. GE identify reference as the rudiment of 
representation. For X to represent Y it has to refer to Y.5 There are two basic modes of 
reference: denotation and exemplification (CJ, 171). Denotation is the relation 
between a name and its bearer. Exemplification is reference to a property by symbol 
that instantiates that property. Denotation and exemplification are not mutually 
																																																								
3 An implicit assumption of the current project is that no satisfactory account of representation is 
currently available, and that therefore an effort to formulate one is not just an idle pastime. For want of 
space we cannot argue for this premise here and refer the reader to (Frigg and Nguyen forthcoming). 
4 Throughout the paper we use the following abbreviations: LA for Goodman (1976), MM for 
Goodman (1984), WRR for  Elgin (1983), CJ for Elgin (1996), TI for Elgin (2010), TE for Elgin 
(2004) and EIS for Elgin (2009). 
5 Notice that GE do not use ‘reference’ as a synonym for ‘denotation’. 
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exclusive. A symbol does not have to be either purely denotational or purely 
exemplificational. Indeed, some symbols combine denotational and exemplificational 
functions to procedure different kinds of ‘complex reference’. A particularly 
important kind of complex reference is representation-as, which involves a 
combination of denotation and exemplification (WRR, 141-2). This kind of reference 
is crucial in the current context because, as we will see, the claim is the scientific 
representation is an instance of representation-as.  
 
This sets the agenda. We begin by introducing denotation and exemplification in 
isolation and then proceed to showing how they can be combined to form 
representation-as.  
 
2.2 Denotation 
 
Denotation is the two-place relation between a symbol and the object to which it 
applies. It is the crucial concept for GE because they see denotation as the core of 
representation both in art and science: 
 
‘Pictures, equations, graphs, charts, and maps represent their subjects by denoting them. They are 
representations of the things that they denote. […] It is in this sense that scientific models represent 
their target systems: they denote them.’ (TI, 2) 
 
So for X to be a representation of Y it is necessary that X denotes Y because 
‘denotation is the core of representation’ (LA, 5). For this reason denotation is 
‘representation-of’ (TI, 4).6  
 
A number of qualifications need to be added about this use of ‘denotation’. First, 
denotation is usually restricted to language, where a name is understood as denoting 
its bearer. This restriction is neither essential nor helpful. Signs other than words of a 
certain language can denote. A portrait can denote its subject, a photograph can 
denote its motif, and scientific model can denote its target system. There is nothing 
intrinsic in the notion of denotation that would restrict it to language (WRR, 19-35; 
TI, 2).  
 
Second, even within language denotation is often restricted to proper names, 
expressions denoting a singular object. ‘Big Ben’, for instance, denotes the great bell 
in tower of the House of Parliament. As such denotation is distinguished from 
predication, which deals with general terms. This restriction is unnecessary: 
 
‘A predicate denotes severally the objects in its extension. It does not denote the class that is its 
extension, but rather each of the members of that class.’ (WRR, 19; cf. LA, 19) 
 
The predicate ‘red’ denotes all red things and a picture of the hydrogen atom denotes all 
hydrogen atoms. 
 
Thirdly, notice that there can be a number of denotational relationships between a 
picture and its subject:   
 
																																																								
6 We put systematicity above grammatical correctness when we write ‘X is a representation-of Y’.  
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‘What a picture is said to represent may be denoted by the picture as a whole or by a part of 
it…Consider an ordinary portrait of the Duke and Duchess of Wellington. The picture (as a 
whole) denotes the couple, and (in part) denotes the Duke’ (LA, 28)  
 
Presumably a part of the picture also denotes the Duchess, another part denotes the 
Duke’s nose, yet another part denotes the Duchess’s dress, and so on. In fact, there 
may, in principle, be an indefinitely large number of denotational relationships that 
hold between parts of the picture and parts of the situation it denotes.  
 
The observation generalises. Whilst a picture may denote, as a whole, what it is a 
picture of, parts of the picture may also denote parts of its subject. Whilst a scientific 
model, as a whole, may denote a target system, parts of the model may also denote 
parts of the target, and so on for other kinds of representations. This is not to say that 
there must be part-part denotational relationships to establish the primary one that 
holds between the picture, or model, and the situation it denotes. Examples from 
modern art provide plausible instances where there is only one such relation. We can 
imagine a uniformly red canvas captioned ‘Kierkegaard’s Mood’ which as a whole 
denotes Kierkegaard’s mood (Danto 1981). It’s hard to imagine what it would take for 
a part of the canvas to denote a part of the philosopher’s mood. So, whether or not 
there are such part-part relationships, and how many of them there are, can only be 
established on a case-to-case basis.      
 
Viewing denotation as the core of representation may seem innocuous, but it has 
important consequences and leads to the introduction of a number of crucial concepts. 
We discuss and illustrate these with the example of pictorial representation. Nothing 
depends on this choice; the same points could be made using other kinds of 
representations. We choose pictures because of their intuitive force and because 
comparing pictures and scientific models will turn out to be instructive in what 
follows.  
 
The first consequence of the view that denotation is the core of representation is that 
not all pictures represent. Pictures of Pickwick or unicorns do not denote anything 
simply because Pickwick does not exist and nor do unicorns. Such pictures therefore 
do not represent anything (LA, 21). This observation generalises: whenever a picture 
portrays something that does not exist then the picture does not represent.  
 
This is counterintuitive and one is tempted to object: if we recognise a picture as 
portraying a unicorn, then surely it represents something, namely a unicorn. GE get 
around this objection by drawing a distinction between ‘representing’ and ‘being a 
representation’. A picture represents if, and only if, it is a representation-of (i.e. if it 
denotes). However, a picture can be a representation without being a representation-
of: 
 
‘A picture that portrays a griffin, a map that maps the route to Mordor, a chart that records the 
heights of Hobbits, and a graph that plots the proportion of caloric in different substances are 
all representations, although they do not represent anything. To be a representation, a symbol 
need not itself denote, but it needs to be the sort of symbol that denotes. Griffin pictures are 
representations then because they are animal pictures, and some animal pictures denote 
animals. Middle Earth maps are representations because they are maps and some maps denote 
real locations. Hobbit height charts are representations because they are charts and some 
charts denote magnitudes of actual entities. Caloric proportion graphs are representations 
because they are graphs and some graphs denote relations among real substances. So whether 
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a symbol is a representation is a question of what kind of symbol it is.’ (TI, 2-3, emphasis 
added; cf. LA, 21) 
 
So whether a picture X is a representation-of depends on whether X denotes 
something. Whether X is representation depends on whether it belongs to a class of 
objects that usually denote. In other words, to be representation something need not 
denote; but it needs to be an object of the right kind. To facilitate our discussion in the 
next section we call this the k-definition of being a representation (where ‘k’ stands 
for ‘kind’).  
 
But how can a picture be a representation without being a representation-of 
something? GE point out that we are mislead by ordinary language into believing that 
something is a representation only if there is something in the world that it represents:  
 
‘What tends to mislead us is that such locutions as “picture of” and “represents” have the 
appearance of mannerly two-place predicates and can sometimes be so interpreted. But 
“picture of Pickwick” and “represents a unicorn” are better considered unbreakable one-place 
predicates, or class terms, like “desk” and “table”. […] From the fact that P is a picture of or 
represents a unicorn we cannot infer that there is something that P is a picture of or represents. 
[…] Saying that a picture represents a soandso is thus highly ambiguous between saying that 
the picture denotes and saying what kind of picture it is. Some confusion can be avoided if in 
the latter case we speak rather of a ‘Pickwick-representing-picture’ of a ‘unicorn-representing-
picture’ […] or, for short, of a ‘Pickwick-picture’ or ‘unicorn-picture’ […] Obviously a 
picture cannot, barring equivocation, both represent Pickwick and represent nothing. But a 
picture maybe of a certain kind – be a Pickwick-picture […] – without representing anything.’ 
(LA, 21-2, emphasis added; cf. TI, 3)  
 
This leads to the introduction of the notion of a Z-representation: X is Z-representation 
if it portrays Z. The crucial point is that this does not presuppose that X be a 
representation-of Z; indeed X can be Z-representation without representing anything. 
A picture must denote a man to be a representation-of a man. But it need not denote 
anything to be a man-representation (LA, 25). There is no presupposition that the k 
and the Z be identical. A picture can be griffin-picture (hence Z = griffin) while it 
qualifies as the kind of symbol that typically denotes because it belongs to the family 
of animal representations (hence k = animal representation). 
 
How does the classification of pictures into different Z-representations work in cases 
in which there are no Zs? If there are no griffins, what is the basis for sorting pictures 
into ones that are griffin-representations and ones that are not? GE respond to this 
question by introducing the notion of a genre: 
 
‘Such an objection supposes that the only basis for classifying representations is by appeal to 
an antecedent classification of their referents. This is just false. We readily classify pictures as 
landscapes without any acquaintance with the real estate – if any – that they represent. I 
suggest that each class of [Z]-representations constitutes a small genre, a genre composed of 
all and only representations with a common ostensible subject matter […] And we learn to 
classify representations as belonging to such genres as we study those representations and the 
fields of inquiry that devise and deploy them.’ (TI, 3) 
 
These genres are habitual ways of classifying and as such they are neither sharp nor 
historically stable, and they typically resist exact codification (LA, 23). This, 
however, does not detract from their importance and usefulness in understanding 
representations.  
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The next vexing question is where denotation comes from: what makes it the case that 
a given X denotes something rather than nothing, and what determines its denotatum 
Y? There is pervasive intuition that resemblance is the source of denotation. A man-
picture represents men, or a particular man, because it resembles, or looks like, men, 
or the particular man. This is wrong. Denotation is independent of resemblance or 
similarity (we use the terms interchangeably). This is obvious enough in the case of 
language where words do not resemble the things they stand for (at least not in any 
obvious way), and the observation carries over to pictures, which would seem to be a 
natural fit for the similarity view. Similarity is not sufficient because it has the wrong 
logical properties: similarity is symmetrical and reflexive while denotation is 
asymmetrical and irreflexive (LA, 5). Whether or not similarity is necessary for 
denotation is a more subtle matter. As Goodman points out, everything is similar to 
everything else in some sense (1972). So all denoting Xs will be similar to their 
denotatums. Thus, if similarity is broadly construed in this way then it is necessary for 
denotation, but vacuously so.  
 
However, in our appreciation of art we do distinguish between relevant and irrelevant 
similarities in a way that allows us to conclude, for instance, that the portrait of the 
Duke and Duchess of Wellington is similar to the Duke and Duchess in a way that 
Picasso’s portrait of Dora Maar is not similar to Dora herself. And yet the portrait still 
denotes her. The same is true of countless modern pieces of art, but the point applies 
elsewhere as well. Henry VIII agreed to marry Anne of Cleves after having seen only 
Holbein’s portrait or her, which depicted her as an attractive young woman. The real 
person was so unlike what he saw on the portrait that Henry decided to annul the 
marriage immediately. Despite the lack of resemblance, Holbein’s portrait did denote 
Anne. And in still life painting denotation and what is depicted come apart entirely. In 
Dutch still life symbolism, a snail-picture denotes the humility of everyday life, a jug-
of-beer-picture denotes pride in the homeland and a butterfly-picture denotes the 
transformations of the soul. So, depending on how similarity is construed, it is either 
unnecessary for denotation, or necessary but vacuously so. Either way, similarity is 
irrelevant to denotation in any important sense.   
 
The lesson we learn from these examples is that denotation can be achieved by an act 
of volition: ‘Representation-of can be achieved by fiat. We simply stipulate: let [X] 
represent [Y] and [X] thereby becomes a representation of [Y]. This is what we do in 
baptizing an individual or a kind’ (TI, 4). In some cases a stipulation may be a simple 
ostensive definition (pointing to Y and say ‘let X denote this’). Whether or not 
stipulation suffices in general for establishing that X denotes Y is a question that we 
cannot address in detail here.7 But it is worth noting that in many cases these 
stipulations have to be mediated by more or less elaborate conventions, which are 
familiar to a certain audience. In other cases denotation is established by simply 
captioning the painting. Sometimes appeal to causal chains needs to be made. And so 
on. The sources of denotation are varied and complicated and much can be said about 
how reference is established in particular cases (see Chapter 3 of MM for a 
discussion). Yet the recognition of this diversity leaves the main point untouched: 
denotation is independent from similarity.  
 
																																																								
7 See Frigg and Nguyen (forthcoming) for further discussion about the relationship between stipulation 
and denotation.  
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The upshot of our discussion is that there is a complete disconnect between the sort of 
representation X is and what, if anything, X denotes: ‘the denotation of a picture no 
more determines its kind than the kind of picture determines the denotation. Not every 
man-picture represents a man, and conversely not every picture that represents a man 
is a man-picture’ (LA, 26; cf. LA, 31).  
 
2.3 Exemplification 
 
An item exemplifies a property if it at once instantiates the property and refers to it: 
‘Exemplification is possession plus reference. To have without symbolising is merely 
to possess, while to symbolise without having is to refer in some other way than by 
exemplifying.’ (LA, 53). An item that exemplifies a property is an exemplar (CJ, 
171). The paradigmatic example of an exemplar is a sample. The swatches of cloth in 
tailor’s booklet of fabrics (LA, 53), the chip of paint on a manufacturer’s sample card 
(WRR, 71), and the bottle of shampoo we receive as promotional gift (ibid.) both 
refer to relevant properties – a pattern, a colour, and a particular hair treatment – and 
instantiate them.8  
 
The formula ‘exemplification is possession plus reference’ stands in need of 
qualification. The point to emphasise is that the ‘plus’ ought not to be read literally. 
Recall from Section 2.1 that denotation and exemplification are basic modes of 
reference. Reference is thus seen as a determinable for which denotation and 
exemplification serve as determinants. If so, then exemplification cannot literally be 
reference with something else added to it. Rather, exemplification is the kind of 
reference that employs instantiation to achieve reference. This can be encapsulated by 
the altering the formula as follows: An item exemplifies property P if it instantiates P 
and thereby refers to P. This formulation makes it clear that exemplification (like 
denotation) is a mode, or kind, of reference: the exemplification of a property P by an 
object X just is a way for X to refer to P that involves instantiation.  
 
Exemplification requires instantiation: an item can exemplify a property only if it 
instantiates it (CJ, 172). Therefore, unlike denotation, exemplification cannot be 
brought about by mere stipulation (TI, 6). Only something that is red can exemplify 
redness. But the converse does not hold: not every property that is instantiated is also 
exemplified. Exemplification is selective (TI, 6). An exemplar typically instantiates a 
host of properties but it exemplifies only few of them. Consider the example of a chip 
of paint: 
 
‘a chip of paint on a manufacturer’s sample card. This particular chip is blue, one-half inch 
long, one-quarter inch wide, and rectangular in shape. It is the third chip on the left on the top 
row of a card manufactured in Baltimore on a Tuesday. The chip then instantiates each of 
these predicates in the previous two sentences, and many others as well. But it clearly isn’t a 
sample of all of them. Under the standard interpretation, it is a sample of “blue”, but not of 
such predicates as “rectangular” and “made in Baltimore”.’  (WRR, 71)9 
 
Which properties are exemplified and which properties are merely instantiated is not 
dictated by the object itself: ‘nothing in the nature of things makes some features 
																																																								
8 Throughout this paper we impose no restriction on what qualifies as a property. An item can 
exemplify one-place properties, multi-place properties (i.e. relations), and higher order, structural, 
properties. 
9 For further examples of selectiveness see LA, 53-4, WRR, 72-3, and TI, 5.  
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inherently more worthy of selection than others’ (CJ, 172). In particular, being 
conspicuous does not, by itself, turn an instantiated property into an exemplified one. 
A can of paint spilled on the carpet is a vivid instance of the paint’s viscosity yet it 
does not exemplify viscosity, or indeed anything else (CJ, 174). Turning an 
instantiated property into an exemplified one requires interpretation (CJ, 175). An 
interpretation is carried out ‘against the constellation of background assumptions. An 
interpreter ignorant of those assumptions may be incapable of interpreting or even 
recognising the symbols’, and ‘[w]ith a change in background assumptions a symbol 
can come to exemplify new features’ (CJ, 176). The specific details of how this works 
varies from case to case. Different ploys will be exercised and different 
interpretational schemes used to render properties salient in Dutch still life painting 
and in electro-dynamical modelling. But for the purpose of general theory nothing 
depends on knowing these details, and one can leave a further elucidation of the 
details to a study of disciplinary conventions and practices without detriment.  
 
Just as parts of a picture can denote parts of its subject whilst the picture denotes the 
subject as a whole, different parts of an exemplar can exemplify different properties, 
all of which may be distinct from those exemplified by the exemplar as a whole. For 
example, the part of the portrait of the Duke and Duchess of Wellington that denotes 
the Duke may exemplify ferocity and candour; whilst the part of the portrait that 
denotes the Duchess may exemplify astuteness and wisdom. But, as per our 
discussion of piecemeal denotation above, whether or not parts of a picture exemplify 
properties in this way depends on the case at hand.  
 
A crucial feature of exemplars is that they provide epistemic access to the properties 
they exemplify: from an exemplar we can learn about its exemplified properties 
(WRR, 93). This is because they instantiate the properties they exemplify in a way 
that makes them salient. The paint chip makes a particular shade of blue salient and 
thereby acquaints those using the chip with that shade of blue. An exemplar is 
therefore not merely an instance of a property but a telling instance (CJ, 173; TI, 5): it 
presents the exemplified properties in a context that is designed to render them salient 
and make them known to those engaging with the symbol. This is indeed a necessary 
condition for an item to exemplify a property: if it does not present the property in 
way that makes it epistemically accessible, then it cannot exemplify it even if it does 
instantiate it. The beam of a flashlight instantiates the speed of light but it does not 
exemplify it because it affords no epistemic access to it (CJ, 174).  
 
Exemplars do not belong to a special category of objects. Anything can in principle 
become an exemplar simply if it serves as an example (TI, 6). Even items that are not 
usually used as symbols can be turned into exemplars simply by being used as an 
example. The front door of a building turns into an exemplar if someone uses it to 
explain to the workers that the all other doors in the building have to be painted in the 
same shade of red. 
 
Summing up, we can give the following definition of exemplification: X exemplifies 
P if and only if X instantiates P and thereby refers to P, and it does so in way that both 
makes P salient and provides epistemic access to P. Bear mind that exemplification is 
by definition a mode of reference – so this condition in effect singles out a specific 
way in which an X can refer to a property P. How saliency is established will be 
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determined on a case-by-case basis, and we say more about interpretational schemes 
in Section 3.3. 
 
There is a final point to clear up before we turn to using exemplification to define 
representation-as. So far we have used a realistic idiom to talk about properties and 
their instantiation. This is an expedient that carries no metaphysical commitments. 
One could provide a nominalist translation for all property-talk, and the notions of 
exemplification that drop out can be used in the manner discussed below regardless of 
the metaphysical position adopted. In fact GE prefer a nominalist view of properties 
(see LA, 4-55, for their nominalist formulation of exemplification). For the purpose of 
this paper nothing hangs on what stance one takes on the question of the metaphysics 
of properties and we remain neutral on the matter.  
 
2.4 Representation-as 
 
Many representations represent a thing as something else. Caricatures are a paradigm 
example: Churchill is represented as bulldog, Thatcher is represented as a boxer, the 
Olympic Stadium is portrayed as a UFO, etc. These are cases of representation-as.  
 
Representation-as can be analysed in terms of representation-of and exemplification 
(LA, 27-31; TI, 3-10). As we have seen in Section 2.2, X is a representation-of Y if X 
denotes Y. And whether or not this is the case is entirely independent of whether or 
not X is a Y-picture or not. This makes room for X to be a Z-representation, and denote 
Y (even where X≠Y≠Z). For instance, X can be a bulldog-picture and denote Churchill. 
Thus, one might be tempted to define representation-as in the following manner: X 
represents Y as Z if and only if X denotes Y and X is a Z-representation. 
 
But having a bulldog-picture denote Churchill is not sufficient to represent Churchill 
as a bulldog. Representing Y as a Z involves more than having a Z-representation 
denote Y:  
 
‘Evidently, it takes more than being represented by a tree-picture to be represented as a tree. 
Some philosophy departments can be represented as trees. But to bring about such 
representation-as is not to arbitrarily stipulate that a tree picture shall denote the department’ 
(TI, 4) 
 
What is lacking in an arbitrary stipulation – even one mediated by linguistic conventions, 
one underwritten by an appropriate causal history, and so on – is a relevant connection 
between Z and Y. There is temptation to invoke similarity to bridge the gap between Z 
and Y and say that X represents Y as Z if, and only if, X is Z-picture and Z is similar to Y. 
GE deny that this is a solution: everything is similar to everything else in some respect 
and therefore the requirement that Z be similar to Y is always trivially true and every Z-
picture represents every Y as Z. Every case of representation is ipso facto also a case of 
representation-as (TI, 4).10 This of course renders the notion representation-as useless.  
 
Furthermore, and indeed more importantly, what matters when representing Y as Z is not 
that Y actually is similar to Z; what matters is that certain features of Z are imputed to Y. 
If we represent Thatcher as a boxer we impute certain properties of a boxer such as 
																																																								
10 For a discussion of similarity see also Goodman (1972). 
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strength, relentlessness and mercilessness to Thatcher. Whether or not she actually is 
similar to a boxer in these regards is immaterial to X’s status as a representation-as; if X 
represents her as a boxer, X represents her as having these properties irrespective of 
whether she actually does.  
 
A representation-as not only represents Y has having certain features of Z; it does so by 
affording epistemic access to these features. The caricature not only shows Thatcher as a 
boxer; it also shows us the properties that are attributed to her. That is the crucial 
difference between a caricature showing Thatcher with boxing gloves and the sentence 
‘Thatcher is like a boxer’. This observation points the way for the final analysis of 
representation-as in terms of exemplification:  
 
I said earlier that when [X] represents [Y] as [Z], [X] is a [Z]-representation that as such denotes 
[Y]. We are now in a position to cash out the “as such”. It is because [X] is a [Z]-representation 
that [X] denotes [Y] as it does. [X] does not merely denote [Y] and happen to be a [Z]-
representation. Rather in being a [Z]-representation, [X] exemplifies certain properties and imputes 
those properties or related ones to [Y]. […] The properties exemplified in the [Z]-representation 
thus serve as a bridge that connects [X] to [Y]. This enables [X] to provide an orientation to its 
target that affords epistemic access to the properties in question.’ (TI, 10) 
 
This gives a name to the step that was missing in the above example of the philosophy 
department: imputation. The tree-picture is not a representation-as of the philosophy 
department because no properties of a tree are imputed to the philosophy department. 
Like representation-of, imputation can be analysed in terms of stipulation. Although the 
tree-picture exemplifies certain properties, when Elgin uses it to represent the philosophy 
department, she does not further impute these properties onto the department. Although 
this further act of stipulation may appear to make the notion of representation-as 
relatively easy to come by, it pays to bear in mind that for an agent to impute properties, 
P1…Pn ,of X onto Y it does not suffice to simply stipulate that Y has P1…Pn, X must also 
exemplify them as well. And as we have discussed previously, this is not a trivial matter 
of stipulation. 
 
We will elaborate further on this definition in the next section. For now we want to add a 
qualification concerning the role of Z. We speak of X representing Y as Z, which might 
suggest that the Z is the crucial ingredient. This is not quite the case. What bears the 
semantic weight in a representation-as are the properties exemplified by X itself. In a 
more precise idiom we would say that X represents Y as having certain properties P1,…, 
Pn, and these properties are instantiated by X. But this does not render Z otiose. As we 
have seen above, in order to establish that X exemplifies P1,…, Pn, one has to turn to 
features outside of X itself and this is where Z is crucial. When Z is a boxer-picture, the 
properties that are exemplified are those that we typically associate with boxers.11 And it 
is these properties that are imputed onto Thatcher when the picture represents her as a 
boxer.  
 
If, however, the same drawing is interpreted not as a boxer-picture but as a Peter-
Buckley-picture, then it would make properties like being a looser salient, and these 
would be imputed on Thatcher.12 So if we say ‘X exemplifies P1, ...,Pn’ then Z is 
eliminable. If we want to explain why M exemplifies P1, ..., Pn rather than Pm, …, Pk, then 
we can appeal to the fact that M is a Z-representation, and P1, ..., Pn are the properties we 
																																																								
11 This is an instance of metaphorical exemplification. We return to this issue in Section 3.3.  
12 Buckley is the world’s worst boxer in that he has lost more fights than any other boxer. 
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typically associate with Z. In this way, talk of Z-representations is an ellipse for 
conveying effectively which properties of X are salient and therefore exemplified by X. 
 
 
3. Entering the Arena of Science 
 
3.1 Scientific representation is representation-as 
 
Representation-as is not only the modus operandi of many pictures; it is also claimed 
to account for how scientific models represent their target systems. Elgin explicitly 
refers to scientific models repeatedly throughout TI and EIS, scientific examples are 
mentioned alongside other representations in CJ, and Hughes (1997) and van Fraassen 
(2008) claim that representation-as is central to the way in which models function in 
science. 
 
We agree with these authors that representation-as is the basic relation between 
models and their targets: models are symbols that refer to their targets, exemplify 
certain features, and represent their targets as exhibiting those features. But the 
discussions we find in the above-mentioned sources are the signposts indicating the 
way to the inn rather than the inn itself. They offer suggestive remarks, but they do 
not provide a nuts-and-bolts account of how models represent their target systems. 
The aim of this section is to provide such an account. We begin by tightening up the 
definition of representation-as to better fit the way that scientific models function 
representationally. We argue that certain aspects of the above definition of 
representation-as do not sit well with scientific models. We then provide a 
reformulation of the definition that eliminates mismatches and tensions, at least with 
respect to scientific representation. 
 
3.2 ‘Or related ones’ 
 
Paradigm examples of representation-as are ones where a property exemplified by X 
is identical to the property imputed to Y. We ponder a certain X because the property 
of interest in Y is no different from the one exemplified by X (TI, 8). However, in 
some instances of representation-as this is not the case. The crucial clause in the 
above definition of representation-as presents X as exemplifying certain properties 
and imputing ‘those properties or related ones’ to Y (TI, 10, emphasis added). In fact 
Elgin emphasises the importance of ‘related ones’:  
 
‘“Or related ones” is crucial. A caricature that exaggerates the size of its subject’s nose, need 
not impute an enormous nose to its subject. By exemplifying the size of the nose, it focuses 
attention, thereby orienting its audience to the way the subject’s nose dominates his face or the 
way his nosiness dominates his character.’ (TI, 10).  
 
How are we to understand this qualification? The observation that the properties 
exemplified by X and the properties imputed to Y need not be identical is exactly 
right. In fact, few, if any, models in science portray their targets as exhibiting exactly 
the same features as the model itself. The problem with invoking ‘related’ properties 
is not its correctness, but its lack of specificity. Any property can be related to any 
other property in some way or other and as long as nothing is said about what this 
way is, it remains unclear what properties X ascribes to Y.  
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In the context of science, the relation between the properties exemplified and the ones 
ascribed to the system is sometimes described one of simplification (CJ, 184), 
idealisation (CJ, 184) and approximation (TI, 11). This could suggest that ‘related 
ones’ means ‘idealised’, at least in the context of science (we are not attributing this 
claim to Elgin; we are merely considering the option). But shifting from ‘related’ to 
‘idealised’ (or any of its cognates) makes things worse rather than better. For one, 
‘idealisation’ can mean very different things in different contexts and hence 
describing the relation between two properties as ‘idealisation’ adds little specificity 
(see, for instance, Jones (2005) and Weisberg (2007) for careful and relatively up-to-
date discussions of different kinds of idealisation). For another, while some 
representations are idealisations of their targets, many are not. A map of the world 
exemplifies a distance of 29cm between the two points labelled ‘Paris’ and ‘New 
York’; the distance between the two cities is 5800km; but 29cm is not an idealisation 
of 5800km. A scale model of a ship being towed through water is not an idealization 
of an actual ship, at least not in any obvious way. Or in standard representations of 
Mandelbrod sets the colour of a point indicates the speed of divergence of an iterative 
function for certain parameter value associated with that point, but colour is not an 
idealisation of divergence speed. 
 
One could put faith into context and argue that no further specifications are needed at 
a general level, and that context determines what properties are imputed onto the 
target. Just as the context in which a caricature is presented makes it clear that we 
oughtn’t impute a large nose to its subject but see the caricature as drawing attention 
to the subject’s nosy character, the context of a scientific model makes it clear what 
properties it imputes to its target. While it may well be true that context determines 
the interpretation of a model, it is important to make explicit in every case of 
modelling what that interpretation is. Indeed, to understand a model, it is crucial to 
know exactly what properties it imputes on its target. We therefore prefer to write an 
explicit specification of the relation between the two sets of properties into the 
definition of representation-as. Let P1, …, Pn be the properties exemplified by X, and 
let Q1, …, Qm be the ‘related’ properties that X imputes on Y. 13  Then the 
representation X must come with a key K that specifies how exactly P1, …, Pn are 
converted into Q1, …, Qm; in fact, K has to provide such specification for all 
properties P1, …, Pn that X exemplifies under a certain interpretation in a certain 
context. Borrowing notation from algebra (somewhat loosely) we can write K
( P1,  …,Pn ) = Q1,  …,Qm . K can but need not be the identity function; any rule that 
associates a unique set Q1, …, Qm with P1, …, Pn is admissible. The relevant clause in 
the definition of representation-as then becomes: X exemplifies P1, …, Pn and imputes 
properties Q1, …, Qm to Y where the two sets of properties are connected to each other 
by a key K.  
 
The idea of a key comes from maps, which serve as a paradigm to understanding 
scientific representation (Frigg 2010). The above examples illustrate what we have in 
mind. Let us begin with the map itself. P is a measured distance on the map between 
the point labelled ‘New York’ and the point labelled ‘Paris’; Q is the distance 
between New York and Paris in the world; and K is the scale of the map (in the above 
case, 1:20,000,000). So the key allows us to translate a property of the map (the 29cm 
																																																								
13 In this n and m are positive natural numbers; it need not be the case that n=m. 
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distance) into a property of the world (that New York and Paris are 5800km apart). 
But the key involved in the scale model of the ship is more complicated. The P in this 
instance is the resistance the model ship faces when moved through the water in a 
tank. But this doesn’t translate into the resistance faced by the actual ship in the same 
way in which distances in a map translate into distances in reality. In fact, the relation 
between the resistance of the model and the resistance of the real ship stand in a 
complicated non-linear relationship because smaller models encounter 
disproportionate effects due to the viscosity of the fluid. The exact form of the key is 
often highly non-trivial and emerges as the result of a thoroughgoing study of the 
situation.14 In the representation of the Madelbrod set in Argyris et al. (1994, 660), a 
key is used that translates colour into divergence speed (see ibid., 695). The square 
shown is a segment of the complex plane and each point represents a complex 
number. This number is used as parameter value for an iterative function. If the 
function converges for number c, then the point in the plane representing c is coloured 
black. If the function diverges, then a shading from yellow over green to blue is used 
to indicate the speed of divergence, where yellow is slow, green is in the middle and 
blue is fast. None of these keys is obvious or trivial. Determining how to move from 
properties exemplified by models to properties of their target systems can be a 
significant task, and should not go unrecognized in an account of scientific 
representation.  
 
In general K is a blank to be filled. What key a given representation is based on 
depends on myriad of factors: the scientific discipline, the context, the aims and 
purposes for which X is used, the theoretical backdrop against which X operates, etc. 
Building K into the definition of representation-as does not prejudge the nature of K, 
much less single out a particular key as the correct one. The requirement merely is 
there must be some key for X to qualify as a representation-as. The above examples 
also show that introducing keys does not amount to smuggling in a mimetic 
conception of representation via the back door. On the contrary, keys can be as 
conventional as we like (correlating, for instance, colour and divergence speed).  
 
Representations can be right or wrong. As we have seen above, that X portrays Y as 
having properties Q1, …, Qm does not prejudge the question whether Y really has 
those properties. There is no guarantee that Y conforms to what is imputed (TI, 10): a 
target may or may not have the properties that the representation ascribes to it. This 
does not call into question the status of X as representation. Truth is no requirement 
for something to be a representation-as.  
 
3.3 The Base of a Representation 
 
The definition of representation-as in Section 2 requires X to be a Z-representation.  
Recall the problem to which the notion of a Z-representation provides an answer. 
Pictures portray something and so they are obviously representations. Some pictures 
portray inexistent objects: griffins, elves, unicorns, the edge of the world, and so on. 
A mimetic theory explains representation in terms of being an effigy of the real 
thing. But there cannot be an effigy of something inexistent. So we face the paradox 
that there are representations that do not represent. GE resolve this paradox by 
offering an alternative analysis of representation: a picture showing a Z (a griffin, 
																																																								
14 See Sterrett (2006) for an illuminating discussion of this example.  
	 14 
say) is a representation because it is the sort of object that denotes (k-definition) and 
it portrays a Z because it belongs to the genre of Z-representations. In this section we 
carry over this account to the case of scientific modelling. As we will see, this 
requires extensions and reformulations in a number of places.  
 
On the face of it there seems to be a mismatch between scientific models and 
pictorial representations. The Schelling model represents social segregation with a 
checkerboard; billiard balls are used to represent molecules; the Phillips-Newlyn 
model uses a system of pipes and reservoirs to represent the flow of money through 
an economy; the worm Caenorhabditis elegans is used as model of other organisms. 
But neither checkerboards, billiard balls, pipes or worms seem to belong to classes of 
objects that typically denote, as would be required by the k-definition. And neither do 
scientific fictions such as elastically colliding point particles, frictionless planes, 
utility-maximising agents and chains of perfectly elastic springs, as well as the 
mathematical objects used in science. Matrices, tensors, curvilinear geometries, 
Hilbert spaces, symmetry transformations, and Lebesgue integrals have been studied 
as purely mathematical objects long before they became important in the sciences, 
and their representational use is not grounded in their membership in a class of 
representational objects (there are also objects such as quaternion groups which are 
similar to the ones just mentioned and therefore belong to same classes but which are 
not representations).  
 
Similar worries arise in connection with the notion of a Z-representation. Models are 
not classified as Z-models because they show or portray Z; they are classified as Z-
models because they are Zs. The pipe model of an economy is not an object that 
portrays pipes (a pipe-representation) that refers to an economy; it is a system of 
pipes. The billiard ball model of gas is not an object that portrays billiard balls (a 
billiard-ball-representation) that denotes a gas; it is a collection of billiard balls. A 
checkerboard model of segregation is not representation of a checkerboard that 
denotes segregation; it just is a checkerboard that is used to represent segregation. 
And the point can be repeated for the chain model of a polymer, the lattice model of 
a crystal, the cellular automaton model of a granular medium, the worm model of 
cell division – or indeed any other model.  
 
So neither the k-definition nor the notion of a Z-representation seem to sit well with 
how models work. We now argue that mismatch is only apparent, but removing the 
air of incongruity requires work and will result in an extension of the framework.  
 
Let us begin with the k-definition. In the current context, the problem with this 
definition is that checkerboards, worms, point particles and matrices aren’t members 
of a class of typically denoting objects in the same obvious way as pictures are. Most 
worms are just organisms and most checkerboards are just checked structures, and so 
neither worms nor checkerboards as such belong to class of objects that typically 
denote. The qualification ‘as such’ is crucial. Some worms are special in that they are 
chosen by someone involved in a scientific investigation to serve as a scientific 
model. In contrast with worms plain and simple, worms so chosen do belong to a 
class of objects that denote. But they do belong to this class not for what they are 
intrinsically, but for the use they are put to. So what turns worms into representations 
is the fact of being used representationally by someone. This point has been made by 
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many, and we agree.15 So at least in the context of scientific modelling the k in the k-
definition is the (trivial) condition that an item is chosen by someone to serve as a 
representation, and any object can be so chosen.16 For this reason anything can, in 
principle, be used as a representation. 
 
The perplexities surrounding Z-representation are more recalcitrant. The problem, as 
we have seen, is that models, unlike pictures, do not seem to fall into classes 
according to what they portray. Constable’s Salisbury Cathedral from the Meadows 
is a cathedral-picture that denotes a particular cathedral in the English countryside. 
But the Phillips-Newlyn model is not a pipe-representation that denotes an economy; 
it is a system of pipes. What has gone wrong? The way out of this jumble is the 
realisation that there is a third layer that has gone unmentioned so far: the substratum 
of representation. Constable’s Salisbury Cathedral from the Meadows is not only a 
cathedral-picture; it is also a canvass mounted on a wooden frame covered with oil 
and pigments of a certain chemical composition. In fact, saying that it is a cathedral-
picture is a shorthand for saying (something like) the following: Salisbury Cathedral 
from the Meadows is a canvass covered with paint, which, under normal visual 
conditions, is recognised by normal spectators as portraying a cathedral.  
 
The somewhat obvious yet crucial point is that every representation has a material 
substratum, and that this substratum ought to be recognised in a theory. We call this 
substratum the base of the representation; base for short.17  The base is seen by 
onlookers as portraying certain motif Z. For reasons that will become clear soon we 
call the process of seeing, say, a cathedral in a configuration of pigments an 
interpretation. We then submit that the right analysis of cases like the Phillips-
Newlyn model is the following. First appearances notwithstanding, the system of 
pipes is indeed a Z-representation, but Z does not stand for ‘pipes’ but for ‘economy’: 
the machine is an economy-representation just as Constable’s canvas is a cathedral-
representation. The base of the representation is the pipe system, which is the 
analogue to the canvass, which is the base of Constable’s painting.  
 
So the mistake we made above was to conflate what representation shows (Z) with 
what the painting is as an object. This mistake was engendered by the fact that the 
focus is on different places in art and in science. Looking at Constable’s painting, we 
could specify the thickness of the layer of paint, we could say what the chemical 
constitution of the paint is, and so on. There are all kinds of things one can say about 
the physical entity that constitutes the painting. Often, however, there is not much 
interest in such considerations (with the exception of conservators or auctioneers 
who might have to restore a painting or prove its originality). In science, by contrast, 
the base is often a matter of great concern. Indeed, models are often classified 
according to what they are rather than to what they represent: we speak of 
checkerboard models, worm models, pipe models, etc. To capture this idea we 
																																																								
15 See for example: Teller (2001); Giere (2004; 2010); Callender and Cohen (2006); Suarez (2004); 
and van Fraassen (2008). 
16 We focus here on how models meet the k-definition, Elgin reaches a similar conclusion regarding 
how something functions as an exemplar. She emphasises that ‘[a]ny item can serve as an exemplar 
simply by being used as an example. So items that ordinarily are not symbols can come to function 
symbolically simply by serving as examples’ (TI, 6, emphasis added cf. WRR, 72, 80).  
17 We assume that our use of the term ‘base’ coincides with Suarez’s ‘source’ (2004, 767) and 
Contessa’s ‘vehicle’ (2007, 48) to denote the object or system that is used to represent a target.  
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introduce a term of art: O-objects. As used here, ‘O’ is simply a specification of what 
kind of thing an object is. A checkerboard is a checkerboard-object; a set of hard 
balls is a hard-ball-object etc.18  
 
Classifying something as O-object says nothing about whether, and if so in what 
way, the object functions symbolically. Anything that exhibits the pattern of a 
checkerboard is a checkerboard-object. Some of these objects are chessboards, some 
are marble floors, and some are elaborately baked cookies. An O-object can, but 
need not, function symbolically. A ‘mere’ O-object can be turned into the base of 
that representation by an act of stipulation. Characterising an object as a base is to 
provide a functional characterisation: something is the base of a representation 
depends on whether it is used as such. Hence the characterisation of something as a 
particular O-object is independent from its characterisation as a base (and vice 
versa). Anything can be used representationally, yet nothing is necessarily or 
intrinsically a representation. 
 
A base object becomes a Z-representation through an act of interpretation. In the case 
of pictures, the nature of this interpretation has been the centre of attention for a good 
while: how one sees a canvass covered with paint as showing a cathedral is regarded 
by many as one of the important problems of aesthetics. Schier dubbed it the ‘enigma 
of depiction’ (1986, 1), and an entire body of literature is been concerned with it (see 
Kulvicki (2006b) for a review). Although an interesting issue in its own right, how 
pictures work is not our concern. The point of interest here is how an O-object is 
turned into a Z-representation in a scientific context: how do we come to see a 
system of pipes and reservoirs as being an economy-representation, or a collection of 
point particles as a gas-representation? There is no simple and universal answer to 
this question. How this is done will depend on disciplinary traditions, research 
interests, background theory and much more. In fact, ‘interpretation’ a blank to be 
filled, and it will be filled differently in different cases. (However, below we discuss 
a constraint on scientific interpretations.) 
 
In an enterprise as diverse as science, this is what one should expect. Sometimes an 
interpretation is ‘close’ to the O-object in that it interprets the object in its ‘own’ 
terms. Scale models are a case in point: the small car is interpreted as car-
representation and the small ship is interpreted as a ship representation. It is 
important, though, that this interpretation is in no way forced upon us by the object 
itself. The small car could be interpreted as a quality-of-paint-representation 
demonstrating to potential customers the quality of paint that certain production line 
is able to produce; or the small ship could be made from potassium and be 
interpreted as a human-bone-model used to study the effects of the presence of 
radioactive isotopes in bone material. These examples are not as far-fetched as they 
may seem. The Phillips-Newlyn machine is a system of pipes and reservoirs, but 
																																																								
18 There is no expectation that O be a natural kind. The choice of a certain base can be seen as defining 
a genre of modelling if there is a tradition of modelling with that base. There are genres of 
checkerboard modelling, Caenorhabditis elegans modelling, cellular automaton modelling, harmonic 
oscillator modelling, billiard ball modelling, and so on. The items belonging to these genres are all 
models using the same base to represent a target system. This class can be large, and target systems can 
be varied. There are cellular automaton models of sand piles, forest fires, earthquakes, traffic jams, and 
many other systems. Using cellular automata to represent a variety of systems can be seen as 
constituting the genre of cellular automaton modelling. 
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these aren’t interpreted in their own terms, i.e. as pipes and reservoirs. This system 
becomes an economy-representation by interpreting the quantity of water as the 
quantity of money, the flow of water through a pipe as the flow of money through a 
part of the economy, and the amount of water in a certain reservoir as the amount of 
water in the central bank. Yet the same object could be a water-supply-system-
representation under another interpretation. 
 
We equally encounter this freedom of interpretation when dealing with fictional 
rather than material models. An imaginary string consisting of beads connected by 
springs is interpreted as polymer-representation, or a collection of harmonic 
oscillators is interpreted as the wall of a black body. Sometimes the same base is 
reinterpreted to become a different Z-representation altogether. A fictional system of 
two spinning spheres in otherwise empty space that attract each other with a 1/r2 
force was interpreted by Newton as sun-earth-representation and by Bohr as a 
hydrogen-atom-representation. And a cellular automaton can variously be interpreted 
as a sand-pile-representation, a forest-fire-representation or a traffic-jam-
representation.19 
 
The basic insight that a Z-representation may but need not represent Z’s stands, and it 
helps explaining the symbolic function of models without target. There certain 
population models that study populations with more than two sexes and find out how 
they evolve  (see Weisberg (2013, §7.4) for a discussion of these models). Such a 
model is an n-sex-population-representation (for a some natural number n > 2), but it 
is not a representation-of an n-sex-population simply because there are no such 
populations.20 The Phillips-Newlyn machine as an economy-representation; but it 
need not be a representation-of any particular economy. It was originally constructed 
as a model of a Keynesian economy, and there was no claim the any real-world 
economy is of this kind. That the machine was later used as a representation-of the 
economy of New Zealand was in no way built into its status as an economy-
representation and establishing denotation in this way constituted an extra and 
conceptually independent step.  
 
There is a final bridge to cross. Recall that the core of representation-as is 
exemplification, and something exemplifies a certain property P if it instantiates P 
and thereby refers to P. Have we not just undermined this very idea by introducing 
the notion of an interpretation? The Phillips-Newlyn machine instantiates water 
levels in a reservoir, but it would not seem to instantiate money levels in a central 
bank. So the problem seems to be that an interpretation introduces properties that the 
O-object doesn’t possess. Admittedly there is a tension. However, nothing in our 
account depends on instantiation being literal instantiation. What matters is that 
properties are epistemically accessible and salient, and this can be achieved with 
what we call instantiation-under-an-interpretation I; I-instantiation for short. An 
economic interpretation of the Phillips-Newlyn machine interprets amounts of water 
as amounts of money. It does so by introducing a clearly circumscribed rule of 
proportionality: x litres of water correspond to y millions of the model-economy’s 
																																																								
19 For an extended discussion of such models see Frigg (2003). 
20 As Weisberg notes there are some recently discovered cases of social insects with three sexes (2013, 
133). But this takes nothing away from our point. These hadn’t been discovered when three-sex 
population models were originally considered (so denotation was established later), and there is no 
principled reason to rule out larger n-sex models, which don’t represent any actual population.  
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currency. This rule is applied without exception when the machine is interpreted as 
an economy-representation. So we say that under the economic interpretation Ie the 
machine Ie-instantiates money properties.  
 
In cases like the scale model under a standard interpretation the properties literally 
instantiated and I-instantiated coincide; in cases like the Phillips-Newlyn machine 
they are different. But even when they are different, the tightness of the interpretation 
guarantees that epistemic access and saliency are warranted. Water flows are 
conspicuous in the Phillips-Newlyn machine, and since the interpretation imposes a 
rule of proportionality that allows for a straightforward conversion of amounts of 
water into amounts of water, money is equally conspicuous. It can then be regarded 
as a necessary requirement for an interpretation to be scientific that it be able to 
establish such a close relation.  
 
In passing we notice that, upon close inspection, the same problem arises in the case 
of pictures. Taken literally a painting only possesses physical properties (namely 
those which it possesses qua physical object): having such and such mass, emitting 
light of a certain spectrum, etc. But typically these are not the properties we are 
interested in, and they aren’t the properties that are associated with the Z of whatever 
type of Z-representation the picture is. The boxer picture exemplified properties 
associated with boxers – toughness, tenacity and so on. But like money in the 
Phillips-Newlyn case, these properties aren’t instantiated in the O-object (the 
canvass). In such cases Goodman and Elgin employ the notion of metaphorical 
exemplification, a notion that requires metaphorical instantiation (LA, 50-51). ‘A 
painting that literally exemplifies ‘dark’ may metaphorically exemplify ‘disturbing’ 
(WRR, 81). To signal the typically high degree of regimentation in scientific contexts 
we prefer to talk about I-instantiation rather than metaphorical instantiation, but this 
may well be a matter of taste and nothing of substance hangs on it.  
 
A representation of Thatcher as a boxer imputes properties on her that the picture 
instantiates metaphorically. In the same way a model can impute properties on the 
target that it I-instantiates. This is to say that the machinery representation-as remains 
unaffected by the introduction of I-instantiated properties: these properties can be 
exemplified, and then keyed up just like properties that are instantiated literally. The 
Phillips-Newlyn machine Ie-instantiates flows of money in some model-currency, 
and those working in the central bank of New Zealand who took the machine to be 
representation-of the economy of their country would have had a key translating 
facts about flows of model-currency into claims about the flow of New Zealand 
Dollars.  
 
3.4 Expedients 
 
Mechanical models of constrained motion based on D’Alembert’s principle exhibit 
virtual displacements; some climate models have flux adjustments; and in 
electrodynamic models of radiation there are advanced potentials with the effect that 
the future exerts a causal influence on the present. Yet no one imputes virtual 
displacements, flux adjustments or advanced potentials to reality. And what is more: 
no one imputes even anything like it to reality. While advanced potentials could be 
(and indeed often are) dismissed as an undesirable side effect of the mathematical 
machinery, virtual displacements and flux adjustments cannot be dismissed in this 
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way. They are crucial features of these models; they are the drivers of the inferential 
machinery and without them the desired results don’t follow. So these features are 
instantiated and they are salient. Yet they are computational conveniences, expedients 
that have no counterparts in reality.  
 
Cases like these show that models have salient features that we do not impute to 
reality. An account of representation must make room for such features. There are a 
number of ways to deal with them in the current framework, and which one chooses 
may well depend on the case at hand. The first is to deny that features like virtual 
displacements are exemplified. Exemplification involves reference over and above 
possession and saliency, and virtual displacements refer to nothing. The second option 
is note that the notion of a key does not require that all exemplified properties be 
translated. The equation K ( P1,  …,Pn ) = Q1,  …,Qm  makes room for m being 
smaller than n and some of the Ps can be left untranslated. These two options seem 
desirable for features that are deemed pure expedients, which makes any translation 
into a real-world counterpart futile from the outset.  
 
Not all instrumental parts of models need to be of that kind. Advanced potentials 
could be real, no matter now fantastic they seem to us now. In this case a key can be 
offered, but imputation can be suspended. So there may be Qs which are simply not 
imputed. In these cases the model does not represent the target as having Q; but Q 
offered for consideration in case the situation changes (which is different from simply 
dismissing something as a pure expedient without any ‘reality value’). There is no 
point in figuring out what the real world counterpart of a flux adjustment would be; 
we know that there is no such thing in the world; but there might be something like an 
advanced potential even thought we deem this implausible given our current state of 
knowledge. This difference in attitude can be reflected in the difference between non-
keying up and suspension of imputation.  
 
3.5 The DEKI Account of Scientific Representation  
 
We are now in a position to tie the loose ends together and provide a definition of 
scientific representation:  
 
Consider an Agent A. The agent chooses an O-object as the base of representation and 
turns it into Z-representation by adopting an interpretation I. Let X refer to the 
package of the O-object together with the interpretation I that turns it into a Z-
representation. X represents Y as Z if, and only if, the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
(RA1) X exemplifies features P1, …, Pn. 
(RA2) X comes with a key, K, specifying how P1, …, Pn are translated into a
 (possibly identical) set of features Q1, …, Qm: K ( P1,  …,Pn ) = Q1,  …,Qm .  
(RA3) X denotes Y, and parts of X may denote parts of Y.  
(RA4) A imputes at least one of the properties Q1, …, Qm onto Y. 
 
We call this the DEKI account of representation to highlight its key features: 
denotation, exemplification, keying-up and imputation. A representation is faithful if 
Y indeed posses the properties that X ascribes to it via A’s imputation (LA, 36). That 
this be the case is not built into the notion of representation-as. X can represent Y as 
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possessing properties Q1, …, Qm and Y cannot instantiate a single of them.21 Scientific 
representation is representation-as: a model represents a target if it is a representation-
as of the target. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the DEKI account 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The DEKI account of representation 
 
 
Let us now add a number of qualifications and comments. The first qualification is 
that this is the general form of an account of representation and as such it needs to be 
concretised in every particular instance of representation. In every concrete case of a 
model representing a target one has to specify what the base object is, how it is 
interpreted, what sort of Z-representation it is and what properties the base object 
exemplifies, how denotation is established, what translation key is used, and how the 
imputation is taking place. Depending on what kind of representation we are dealing 
with, these ‘blanks’ will be filled differently. But far from being a defect, this degree 
of abstractness is an advantage. Scientific modelling is an umbrella term covering a 
vast array of different activities in different fields, and a view that sees representations 
in fields as diverse as elementary particle physics, evolutionary biology, hydrology 
and rational choice theory work in exactly the same way is either mistaken or too 
coarse to make important features visible. Our definition occupies the right middle 
ground: it is general enough to cover a large array of cases and yet it highlights what 
all instances of scientific representation have in common.  
 
A second qualification is that the ordering of the conditions is not supposed to 
introduce a temporal element into scientific representation, nor indicate any logical 
																																																								
21 It ought to be noted also that faithfulness is orthogonal to the realism versus antirealism question (TI, 
13). Agent A can interpret the model so that it either only exemplifies observable properties or, that 
only observable properties are keyed up. Such an interpretation is antirealist.  
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priority. It needn’t be the case the a model user first establish denotation, before 
determining which properties are exemplified by the model and only then translating 
them and imputing them to the target system. None of the four conditions RA1-4 has 
to be established prior to the others, and the model could exemplify the properties 
even before being taken as a representational base by an agent. A model user could 
equally well start off with the target system and a set of properties of interest. She 
could then construct an inverse key associating those properties with ones that we 
have firmer grasp on in the context of model building.22 She could then construct a 
model that exemplifies those properties, in the appropriate manner against the 
appropriate interpretational scheme, before taking the model as a representational 
base and establishing the denotation relation between it and the target. Such a process 
is not ruled out by our conditions. DEKI does not function as a diachronic account of 
scientific representation. It is synchronic: as long as the conditions are met, in 
whatever order, a model represents its target system as B.  
 
Also notice that our account makes it obvious how scientific models can be used to 
learn about their target systems. We look at the properties P1, …, Pn exemplified by 
the model, along with the key, and infer that the target system has the properties  Q1, 
…, Qm that result from the application of the key. It is important though to emphasise 
that the key often has the character of a hypothesis (Frigg 2010, 129). We stipulate 
that we expect a model to represent in a particular way. This stipulation may be 
grounded in background knowledge, a theory, or yet something else. There is no 
guarantee that the target indeed instantiates the imputed properties. Whether or not 
this is the case does not follow from the model itself and has to be determined by 
other means. As this is the methodological aspect of the above observation that 
faithfulness is not built into the notion of representation.  
 
Fourthly note that our previous discussions of the piecemeal nature of denotation and 
exemplification are relevant here as well. Just as a X can represent Y as having 
properties Q1, …, Qm, a part of X can represent a part of Y as having properties Q1, …, 
Qm. And this can be explained in an analogous manner to the above. A part X’ of X 
exemplifies a set of certain properties. The key translates those properties into a 
(possibly identical) set of properties. Assuming that X’ denotes a part Y’ of Y and the 
agent imputes those properties onto Y’, then X’ represents Y’ as having the properties 
Q1, …, Qm. Again, whether or not parts of X denote parts of Y, and whether or not the 
former represent the latter as having properties Q1, …, Qm is something that has to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Fifthly, typically the interpretation is chosen so that it interprets the base in terms of 
the target. If the intended target is an economy, the interpretation would usually 
construe the base object as an economy. This, however, is a rule of common sense 
rather than a requirement of semantics. One could construct contrived examples 
whereby, say, a pipe system is interpreted as an economy and taken to be a 
representation-of a biological population. 
 
Furthermore, while space constraints prevent us from offering a comprehensive 
comparison of the DEKI account with other accounts of representation, a few quick 
remarks along those lines are in order. It is now clear where purely stipulative 
																																																								
22 We are grateful to Alexander Bird for pointing out this possibility.  
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accounts of scientific representation go wrong. Above we said that a ‘mere’ object is 
turned into a representation by being used representationally by someone. This may 
suggest that all it takes to turn an object into a scientific representation is to baptise it 
as a representation. This view has been advocated by Callender and Cohen, who argue 
that scientific representation comes down to an act of arbitrary stipulation (2006, 73-
74). But stipulation is only part of the story. Choosing a particular object as the X for 
one’s representation is an arbitrary act of stipulation. But that object becomes a 
representation-as only once denotation is established (which may, or may not, involve 
a further act of stipulation), an interpretation is adopted and properties are exemplified 
(and since exemplification requires instantiation more than an act of fiat is needed for 
this to be the case), a key is to be introduced and the Q-properties have to be imputed 
on the target (again, which may involve a further act of stipulation). To do this 
successfully requires more than pointing to two objects and declaring ‘the first shall 
be a representation of the second’.   
 
Also of interest is the relation between representation-as and the similarity view of 
representation. Using X to represent Y as Z involves imputing properties of X, or 
related ones, to Y. Is that not tantamount to claiming that X and Y are similar to one 
another, at least in some respects and to some degrees? The grain of truth in this 
observation is that the base and the target sometimes do share properties. But this 
need not always be so and the sharing of properties is not sufficient for representation. 
Properties of the X have to be connected to those imputed to Y with key K. Sometimes 
the key can say that the properties in the model are idealisations of the properties of 
the target (for instance when we model the surface of an ice rink as frictionless). In 
such a case it is plausible to say that the properties in question are similar. However, 
keys need not be of this kind; they can correlate properties that are rather dissimilar. 
Claiming colours are similar to divergence speeds or that distances on a map are 
similar to distances in the world would stretch the notion of similarity beyond 
breaking point even if on a liberal understanding of similarity. And understanding the 
differences between the model ship and real ship in their interaction with a viscous 
liquid was an important set in understanding what forces affect the motion of a body 
through water. 23  So there are cases of representation-as that are not cases of 
similarity. And even resemblance in the relevant respects and degrees is not 
sufficient. As Elgin (TI, 11-12) points out, it is not enough for the similarity to be 
there, the representation must make that similarity manifest. Hidden similarities don’t 
ground representation, but making them salient requires exemplification.  
 
Finally let us turn to the notion of a scientific model. Even though ‘scientific model’ 
and ‘scientific representation’ have often been used almost interchangeably, models 
and representation have an uneasy relationship. Trivially not all representations are 
models. And vice versa not all models are representations, as the examples of multi-
sex populations and Yang-Mills particles illustrate (see Weisberg (2013, §7.4) and 
Hartmann (1995) respectively for further discussion of these target-less models). 
There are also the cases of models such as Maxwell’s model of the ether that were, at 
some point in time, thought to denote actual target systems, but then turned out to fail 
to do so. A full examination of this relationship is a task for another day. The aim or 
our paper is not to equate models and representations. Indeed we put forward only the 
																																																								
23 One can of course retrospectively call the relevant scaling relation ‘similarity’, no matter how 
complicated it turns out to be. This is not wrong; but it is useless. ‘Similarity’ is just a label attached to 
a relation ex post facto, and it contributes nothing to either discovering or understanding that relation.  
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more modest conditional claim: if a model represents a target, then it does so in the 
sense of the DEKI. In other words, if a model is representational, then the model takes 
the place of X in the definition of representation-as; the target takes the place of Y; 
and the four conditions are met. This, however, leaves open the question of how to 
define a model, and it involves no claim that all models represent.  
 
4. A Glimpse at Cases 
 
In this section we briefly indicate how the theory we have outlined applies to different 
types of scientific models. We present sketches of a number of cases; for want of 
space we leave in-depth case studies for another occasion.  
 
4.1 Material Models 
 
Material models are models whose base is a material object. The wooden model of 
car, the model of the new Airbus A380 in the travel agent’s window, and the ball-and-
stick models used in chemistry classes are standard examples. Architectural models of 
buildings belong to this group, and so do Caenorhabditis elegans, the Phillips-Newlyn 
machine, the hydraulic model of the San Francisco Bay, and insect robots.24 Some of 
them are ready-mades in that they occur in nature and have been selected to function 
as models because they instantiate properties under scrutiny; others have been 
carefully crafted to instantiate certain features of interest. This illustrates the point that 
exemplification requires instantiation. If all that mattered was denotation one could 
have one’s saltshaker represent the San Francisco Bay. This won’t work because 
typically saltshakers don’t instantiate properties that can be keyed up with ones of the 
Bay. Scientists carefully choose their models because they are useful only if they 
instantiate the right properties.  
 
This does not imply, however, that all properties that are instantiated matter; nor does 
it imply that a model imputes its own properties one-to-one on the target. 
Exemplification is selective. A wood model of a car and architectural model of house 
exemplify their shape but not their material constitution. To infer from such models 
that the car has a wooden body or that the balcony of the house is made from PVC is 
misunderstanding what properties the model exemplifies. Even if models are given 
the right interpretation and the exemplified properties are identified correctly, 
properties are not imputed on the target using a ‘same same’ rule, nor is the relation 
always simple scaling. The real car’s air resistance will not be ten times the 1:10 
model’s air resistance. Understanding the key of model is crucial. In cases such as 
architectural models this is easy; in cases such as the car’s air resistance it is far from 
trivial.  
 
In fact spelling out the key of such a model is nothing short of a science in its own 
right. Sterrett (2002) provides a vivid description of the complex interplay of 
dimensional analysis, scaling relations, and theoretical tools like the Mach number, 
the Reynolds number and the Richardson number that are involved in using a material 
model to learn about the mechanical properties of a target system. And similar stories 
																																																								
24 For further discussions of these models see: Ankeny (1998) for Caenorhabditis elegans; Morgan 
(2012, Chapter 5) for the Phillips-Newlyn model; Weisberg (2013) for the San Francisco bay model; 
and Webb (2001) for robotic models of insect behaviour.   
	 24 
can be told about almost every material model. The details of these stories don’t 
matter for now; what matters is that they fit the mould of our account of 
representation: the material model exemplifies properties that are keyed up with other 
properties in a potentially complicated and nontrivial way. These properties are then 
imputed on the object, which is denoted by the model.  
 
4.2 Fictional Models 
 
Fictional models are models whose base is a non-existent object. The stock examples 
of mechanical modelling fall into this category: a perfect cylinder rolling down an 
inclined frictionless Euclidean plane, a small perfect sphere orbiting around a large 
perfect sphere where the only force acting on either is the mutual gravitational 
attraction, etc. Models involving point particles, three sex populations, perfectly 
rational agents, and markets in equilibrium also belong to this family of models. It is 
readily acknowledged that such models are abstract, in the sense that they are not 
spatio-temporally located. But, for our account to apply to these models we have to 
make sense of how they can exemplify properties. In particular, since exemplification 
requires instantiation, we have to make sense of how such models can instantiate 
properties.  
 
For some properties this is relatively straightforward. A three-sex model instantiates 
the property of being biological model. A two-body model instantiates the property of 
being a mechanical model. But these properties do not exhaust the properties 
exemplified by such models. At least some of the properties exemplified by such 
models seem to be physical properties. We use them to learn about how reproduction 
rates vary with the number of sexes in a population, or the specific physical orbit of a 
body under the influence of gravitational attractive of a larger mass.   
 
In the context of discussing how the similarity-based account of scientific 
representation accounts for the purported similarity between the ideal pendulum and 
an actual pendulum, Martin Thompson-Jones points out that:  
 
‘[N]o non-spatiotemporal object can have the properties ascribed to the simple pendulum, for 
no object which has, for example, a length, and behaves in the way the simple pendulum is 
said to behave in descriptions of it - moving through space over time in a particular way - can 
be non-spatiotemporal’ (2010, 291) 
 
The observation generalises to all fictional models (TI, 8-9). If such models cannot 
instantiate physical properties, then they cannot exemplify them; and if they cannot 
exemplify them, then they cannot represent a target as possessing them. So no 
fictional model can represent a planet as having mass or a population as consisting of 
rabbits simply because no fictional object can have a certain mass or consist of 
rabbits. This, so the objection goes, leads to the breakdown of our account because 
these models clearly represent actual target systems as having such properties.  
 
Let us briefly sketch the main line of argument of two replies. The first appeals to the 
fiction view of models, which regards models as fictional scenarios of the same kind 
as, say, Tolkien’s middle Earth (Godfrey-Smith 2006). Far from opening the flood-
gates to arbitrariness, this view carefully regulates what properties model-objects 
possesses. It is true in Lord of the Rings that hobbits are diminutive humanoids; it is 
false that they are giants. In the same way it is true in the Newtonian model of the 
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solar system that planets move in stable elliptical orbits; it is false that they move in 
square orbits. In other words, according to the relevant fictions hobbits instantiate 
humanoidity while they do not instantiate giantness, and orbits of model planets 
instantiate ellipticality while they do not instantiate squareness. Different versions of 
the fiction approach explain fictional truth and fictional instantiation differently, but 
no account does without it.  
 
One of us has offered a version of this view in which models are identified with acts 
of imagination (Frigg 2010). Walton’s pretence theory is used to explain the status of 
imagined objects, and both an account of truth in fiction as well as an epistemology 
for models thus understood is offered. So on this view there is a clear distinction 
between properties that a fictional object has and ones that it doesn’t have, and the 
model affords epistemic access to the properties of interest. Making a property salient 
is no different in fictional model than in material one; and neither is the establishment 
of a denotational relationship. So we have found all the ingredients needed for 
exemplification, and we see no reason why one should not say that fictional scenario 
exemplifies properties as long as it is understood that instantiation is explained in as 
an act of pretence.  Both models, and parts of thereof, fictionally instantiate physical 
properties just in case we are prescribed to imagine that the system, or parts thereof, 
instantiates those properties. And we can simply generalise the notion of 
exemplification to allow for fictional instantiation: X exemplifies P if and only if X 
(fictionally or otherwise) instantiates P and thereby refers to it.  
 
An alternative response to Thompson-Jones’ objection is to simply point out that the 
account of scientific representation proposed here, does not require that scientific 
models literally instantiate physical properties. This observation can be utilized in 
response to the objection in two distinct ways. Firstly, just as the notion of an 
interpretation allows us to make sense of physical O-objects I-instantiating physical 
properties that they don’t literally possess, it also allows us to make sense of abstract 
O-objects I-instantiating physical properties that they cannot posses qua abstract 
object. Secondly, note that all that is required by RA1 is a scientific model exemplify 
a set of some properties P1, …, Pn  which are translated with the help of key into a  set 
of properties, Q1, …, Qm, (which need not be identical to P1, …, Pn ) which can then 
be imputed onto the target. There is no presumption that the P1, …, Pn be physical 
properties. Elgin (TI, 8-9) suggests that abstract models can instantiate magnitudes of 
physical properties such as mass, and that this is sufficient to do the work we need it 
to do: 
 
‘[…] not being a material object, the model does not have mass. So it cannot exemplify the mass of 
the pendulum. This is true. Strictly, the model does not exemplify mass. Rather it exemplifies an 
abstract mathematical property, the magnitude of the pendulum’s mass. […] It does no harm to say 
that they exemplify physical magnitudes. But this is to speak loosely. Strictly speaking, they 
exemplify mathematical (or other abstract) properties that can be instantiated physically.’ (TI, 8-9) 
 
Thus, scientific models can represent their targets as having physical properties 
without instantiating them themselves.  
 
These replies to Thompson-Jones are not mutually exclusive. One may be a 
fictionalist with respect to most scientific models, whilst still admitting that purely 
mathematical models are, ontologically speaking, mathematical structures (either 
those directly presented, or those structures satisfying certain mathematical 
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equations), and that these structures either I-instantiate physical properties, or the key 
that links them to their target systems takes mathematical properties to physical ones. 
The ontological requirements of our account of scientific representation are minimal.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
We have developed an account of scientific representation that provides detail to the 
claim that the representational relationship between models and their targets is one of 
representation-as. In doing so we have relied heavily in GE’s account of denotation, 
exemplification, and representation-as in art. One might object that we have bet on the 
wrong horse. GE’s account of representation is not uncontroversial in the realm of 
pictorial representation. Indeed Douglas Arrell writes: 
 
‘Goodman’s contention that representation is a form of denotation has achieved notoriety 
rather than acceptance. A survey of some forty of the articles and reviews which appeared in 
the wake of Languages of Art reveals that in about three-quarters of them this theory was a 
major topic of concern, and that overwhelmingly, the concern was to refute it; indeed, it is 
hard to find a clear-cut case of someone agreeing with it’ (1987, 41)  
 
If the account does not work in aesthetics, why should we expect it to work in the 
context of scientific representation? In answer to this, it is worth briefly outlining why 
aestheticians have found GE’s discussion of pictorial representation so unsatisfactory, 
and why we think the objections – even if assumed to be sound – have no bite in the 
current context.  
 
The first point to observe is that majority of objections to GE’s discussion of 
representation focuses on pictorial representation rather than the notion of 
representation-as, or its basis in exemplification. Indeed, Robinson notes that in 
‘contrast with the reams of pages devoted to Goodman on representation, the concept 
of exemplification has been relatively neglected’ (2000, 215). We have been careful 
to remain silent on the issue of whether representation-as applies to pictorial 
representation. But it seems clear to us that the most powerful objection against GE 
with respect to pictorial representation as representation-as are irrelevant here. The 
objection stems from the observation that we recognise what a pictures represents by 
means of our perceptual experience (or at least something closely related to it) when 
looking at the picture. Schier calls this the ‘natural generativity of pictures’ (1986), 
relatedly Wollheim refers to the perceptual skill of ‘seeing-in’ which itself was 
influenced by Gombrich’s account of pictorial representation as being based on the 
illusion of thinking we are viewing the target of the representation (Gombrich 
1960).25 
 
Regardless of how plausible this objection is in the case of pictorial representation, it 
is irrelevant in the context of scientific representation. There is no ‘natural 
generativity’ of scientific models, and no phenomenological experience of ‘seeing-in’. 
If there were, it would make the practice of science much easier than it actually is. 
That models need to be interpreted, both to determine what is exemplified, and to find 
an appropriate key for translating such properties into ones imputed on their target 
systems, is a significant part of scientific practice.  
 
																																																								
25 See Kulvicki (2006b) for an overview of the variety of proposed accounts of pictorial representation. 
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Finally, a substantial part of critical discussion of GE’s account of pictorial 
representation has focused on how they distinguish it from other kinds of 
representation. The details of this distinction – syntactic and semantic density and 
repleteness – go beyond our current purpose (see Kulvicki (2006a) for an accessible 
overview of these notions, and criticisms thereof). Again, these elements play no role 
in our account and we do not use them to demarcate scientific representation from 
other kinds of representations. As such, criticisms against them do not bite here.  
 
So, the most pertinent criticisms against GE’s account of representation in aesthetics 
are irrelevant to the position advanced in this paper. We conclude that scientific 
representation should be seen as representation-as. This claim has been made before, 
but not with the level of detail needed to fully understand its impact. In this paper we 
have provided such detail. What falls out is this: denotation; exemplification; 
translation keys; and imputation are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions on scientific representation. As we have discussed, these conditions are 
abstract in the sense that they need further specification in each instance, but they 
remain general enough to capture what all cases of scientific representation have in 
common. The next step is to understand the instances, and the framework we have 
presented tells us how to do that. When faced with a specific model representing a 
specific target the questions to ask are the following: How is denotation established? 
What interpretation is adopted? What properties does the model exemplify and how 
does it make them salient?  What properties does the key translate, and what 
properties does it translate them to? Which of these are imputed onto the target, and 
how? Answers to these questions, across multiple instances, will then deliver a rich 
understanding of how scientific models represent the world.  
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